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BOOK REVIEWS

VIETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: An analysis of the Legality
of the U. S. Military Involvement by the Consultative Council
of the Lawyers Committee On American Policy Towards Vietnam.
O'Hare 1967.

The Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam was
formed after the Department of State issued a defense of
Ametican Vietnamese policy in 1965. The Committee, at that
time, reached the conclusion that:
...the actions of the United States in Vietnam
contravened essential provisions of the United Nations
Charter; violated the Geneva accords, which we pledged
to observe; were not sanctioned by the treaty creating
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; and violated
our own Constitution.
In 1966 the Office of the Legal Adviser of the State Department issued a Memorandum refuting the Committee's report.
Feeling that this new report was "highly vulnerable and
incapable of justifying an undeclared war of even more fateful dimensions", the Lawyers Committee has now issued a fresh
reply prepared by an eminent group of international law professors. This 'Consultative Council' is headed by Richard A.
Falk of Princeton (who will be the guest of the International
Law Society at Vanderbilt this spring) and includes Hans J.
Morganthau, the political scientist and author.
The current reply to the State Department charges that
military intervention by the United States in Vietnam violates
the Geneva Accords of 1954. While the United States has
relied heavily on reports of the International Control Commission that North Vietnam was violating the Accord, the
Government has ignored the same reports concerning its own
illegal activities.
In the Committee's reply, American actions are criticized
as violative of international law in that they represent an
intervention in a foreign civil war. The report states that
there is rightfully only one Vietnam since the present
division between North and South is only a temporary line
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which was to disappear in 1956. The Committee states that the
South is neither a republic nor a country. For this reason0 its
call for help does not legally justify the United States presence
there. The Committee terms the South Vietnamese administration
a mere client of the United States.
The U.S. position that the SEATO agreement imposes an obligation to intervene is criticized because that treaty does not
contemplate unilateral action. The Committee reminds the reader
that the other signers of the Treaty have never formally authorized
the United States to act in SEATO's name.
The report labels United States actions in Vietnam as unlawful "reprisals" and argues that even if the United States were
lawfully participating in the collective self-defense of South
Vietnam, certain of its military methods would nevertheless be
unlawful.
Much of the report is based on alleged American violation of
the United Nations Charter, specifically Article 33(1) which
requires attempts at peaceful solutions before resorting to armed
conflict. From the belief that the United States is violating
this and other treaties signed in accord with Constitutional provisions, the authors conclude that the United States violates its
own Constitution. Consequently, the report calls for immediate
de-escalation and an implementation of methods permitted by the
United Nations charter.
For lawyers and students interested in Vietnam, this book is
invaluable. Structured as a legal brief, it is clear, concise and
only 86 pages long (excluding appendices).
The principal practical criticism which can be aimed at the
Committee concerns its perhaps too heavy reliance on the United
Nations charter. Although the United States did commit itself,
perhaps, to peaceful solutions by its efforts to establish the
United Nations in the late forties, that organization's own record
has shown the folly of expecting it to keep peace. But then,
this argument takes us away from international law and back to
Realpolitik. And the Committee's report prefers to speak in terms
of law 0 not pragmatic politics.

RoT.Do
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BEYOND VIETNAM:

The United States and Asia.

Reischauer 242 pages.

Knopf (Paperback:

Edwin 0.

Vintage $1.65) 1967.

Thirteen years ago, Edwin 0. Reischauer published, Wanted:
An Asian Policy, a book dealing with American policy toward
Asia. In it he pleaded for a new look at our Asian foreign
program while specifically warning against involvement in what
was then the Indochinese War. As Mr. Reischauer notes:
"My
book sank quietly into the sea of library volumes without
raising a ripple... Storm warnings might be up in Vietnam, but
we were not prepared to recognize them. We continued to drift
toward new catastrophes." Mr. Reischauer's new book, Beyond
Vietnam, is certainly not going to',,sink quietly into the
sea...". Due partly to the well-earned reputation of its
author and its early critical acclaim, the work will certainly
be read by concerned Americans. Whether it will affect the
course of American policy any more than its predecessor is now
the crucial question.
Edwin Oldfather Reischauer is as much at home in Asia as
he is in America. Born in Tokyo in 1910, he lived in Japan
until he was 17. After attending Oberlin and Harvard, he
taught in various Asian universities and married a member of
a prominent Japanese family. He became an extremely popular
and influential Amabassador to Japan after being appointed by
President Kennedy in 1961 and resigned last year to return to
Harvard where he teaches Japanese history and political science,
Mr. Reischauer has not written a moralistic tome on
Vietnam of the type so often seen in the last few years. Instead, Beyond Vietnam is a clear, realistic and thoroughly
blunt analysis of our failure in Asia, together with concrete
proposals for change. While most of the book is devoted to
charting a new 'total policy' for Asia, he realizes that the
immediate dilemma of Vietnam cannot be ignored.
What Reischauer has to say about Vietnam, however, is
not of comfort to either 'hawks' or 'doves'. He feels that
the slow, painful policies of the present administration together with a "slow simmering down" of the War is our best
remaining alternative. While clearly disapproving of the
policies that got us into Vietnam, blaming "unsound analogies"
and "bureaucratic drift", he sees a necessary role for the
United States in Asia, a role which we can never play if
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ignominiously forced to renege on our original and often
repeatdd promises to South Vietnam.
Reischauer opposes withdrawal and feels that a military,
economic and political squeeze on the Vietcong is necessary to
force them into at least a temporary truce or negotiations.
The costly pacification campaign must be pursued, he believes,
to convince the Vietnamese that their best hopes are with
Saigon. He sees this unappealing process as our only possible
course and considers it unrealistic to hope that escalation
can in some manner end the conflict. While acknowledging that
there is no hope of talks with the Vietcong before the 1968
elections in this country, he suggests the announcement of
"realistic and generous terms of settlement" which might bear
fruit after the elections. His strategy otherwise seems not
much different from that of Secretary of Defense MacNamara.
Reischauer is not primarily concerned with agonizing
over the mistakes which have made such a bleak policy necessary in his eyes, but with pointing out that future Vietnams
are around the corner unless we change our current stance in
Asia,
The author believes that our system of bilateral defense
treaties with poor Asian countries produces only hostility
towards us and that SEATO is virtually worthless. Our aid
programs are faulty and our foreign policy generally antiquated.
Understandably, Japan plays a major role in promoting the
"stability" that Reischauer feels is necessary in Asia. As
the only Oriental country with a fully developed industrial
economy, Japan demonstrates to the rest of Asia that Red-Guard
regimentation is not a necessary prerequisite to affluency.
The early return of Okinawa to Japan, a dropping of trade
barriers and a new respect for Japan's importance and independence are advocated as best serving America's interests
in the long run.
As Japan embodies our major hopes for Asia, China
epitomizes our greatest fears. Yet, Reischauer argues that
most of these fears are poorly founded. Although he does not
discount the possibility of conflict over Vietnam, he reminds
us that China is very weak, that she cannot approach the power
of Japan in the forseeable future and that she needs contact
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with the world far more than she needs isolation. Nationalism
is the greatest force in Asia, not Communism, and the Chinese
find themselves faced with increasing racial animosity from
other Asians. Reischauer believes that "time is on our side";
all we need to do is be patient.
The author suggests that America leave the fighting of
revolutions and even the suppression of subversion to the
Asians. Regardless of the forms the new governments take,
they will invariably be highly nationalist and not
tied to any international "conspiracy". Thus it follows that
a Vietnam - or Indochina-led by Ho Chi Minh probably would
have been in our best interests. Now our object must be to
preserve "stability" by force of arms in cases of Korea-like
invasion, if necessary, so that Asian countries can develop
as they wish.
Reischauer's main concern is American national interest.
His proposals to effectuate consistent policies are concrete
and exciting. He suggests for exampla that the U. S. dispense
its aid through intermediary financial experts hired by recipient
nations who would set up specific projects. These plans would
then be approved and financed by American aid. Thus, the real
goal of economic advancement might be achieved without the onus
of American control. Mr. Reischauer's other suggestions are
too numerous to list. It is sufficient to say that they prove
him to be a clear-headed man with a rational plan for the
future--a plan which, if followed, just might keep us out of
more Vietnams.
W.G.C.
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ON TRIAL:

THE SOVIET STATE VERSUS "ABRAM TERTZ" AND "NIKOLAI

ARZHAK", Translated, edited, and with an introduqtion by Max
Hayward, 1-83 pages with index, Harper and Row (paperback),.$1o95o
To western eyes the role of the Soviet artist and writer
during the last half century has been one of strict conformity
to dictated ideological precepts. Consequently Soviet writers
and artists, with few exceptions, have been relatively unknown
in the West. While the example of recent writers like Pasternak,
Yevtushenko, and Voznesensky prove that non-ideological writing
is alive in Russia, the histories of these men also illustrate
the remaining obstacles to freedom of literary expression. Max
Hayward's On Trial prints the official record of the trial of
two other Russian writers, Yqri Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky, and
tells of the events that led to their conviction for "slander"
in 1966.
Mr. Hayward believes that the trial of these two writers is
unprecedented in Soviet history, because
i.t was the first time ...that writers had been put on
trial for what they had written. Many Soviet writers
(had) been imprisoned, banished, executed or driven
into silence, but never before after a trial in which
the principal evidence against them was their literary
work.
Daniel's and Sinyavsky's "crime" was writing and publishing
abroad works which they believed could not be published inside
the Soviet Union. Publishing under the psuedonyms of "Abram
Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak", the two authors embarrassed Soviet
officials with their ostensibly critical satires of life in
contemporary Soviet Russia.
The two men knew of the danger of publishing such works.
Soviet literature and culture has been dominated from the inception
of the Communist government by the principle of functionalism and
a marked intolerance of criticism and deviation. Under Stalin
the concept of functionalism reached its peak and in its literary
form became dogmatized in the school of thought called "socialist
realism". While the school drew its methodology from the classic
Russian writers, Chekhov, Turgenyev, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, it
found its purpose in the promulgation and praise of the philosophy
of the Russian Revolution, the course of the Communist movement,
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and the vigor and the strivings of the Russian peoples. As a
doctrine it was applied to all forms and aspects of literature,
even to the extent of designating acceptible verse forms.
Administration of these doctrinaire requirements was up to the
Union of Soviet Writers and sometimes more effective enforcement
was accomplished by means of the formal and informal purges of
the Stalinist era. As a consequence, literary development in a
country which probably worships great writing more than any
other, ground to a standstill. Only one important writer,
Mikhail Sholokhov (And Quiet Flows the Don), was produced.
In 1956 the Destalinization of Russian culture did not
bring the expected relief to those writers who desired a greater
freedom of expression. Yet the demands of the younger writers
and the sudden acclaim of Boris Pasternak showed new forces
emerging in Russia. The previous censorship policy was subjected
not only to internal criticism from "underground" liberal factions
but also a close scrutiny by the foreign admirers of Russian
literature. The governmental censure of Pasternak angered and
alarmed many who clamored for an explanation which was not forthcoming. But great hopes for a liberalization of censorship
remained until 2 years ago when they were dealt what appeared to
be a fatal blow when Sinyavsky and Daniel were arrested and charged
with slander of the Soviet regime and the Soviet people. The
works in question had an admittedly critical tenor, but in an
analysis of passages used by the prosecution as evidence of the
writers' slander and subversive intent, Mr. Hayward concludes that
there is very little which could even be construed as anti-Soviet.
He feels that the two young authors were convicted more because
of the interpretations placed on their works by overzealous
Western critics than by their own words. Indeed there is an
indication in the transcript of the authors' testimony that the
interpretation given by the Western press was as much a surprise
to them as it was an embarrassment to the Soviet authorities.
Sinyavsky and Daniel maintained in their testimony that they
intended no slander and at most sought to offer constructive or
positive criticism of what they saw amiss in Russian culture and
society. Often what an author may write as a literary device or
invention is not what he seeks to convey in the totality of the
work: there is a difference between literal and figurative language. The prosecution of the trial was certainly marked by an
inability to deal with figurative language, the court consistently
interpreting passages used as evidence out of context and in a
strictly literal way.
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It may be said that Sinyavsky and Daniel were convicted
because of a too liberal use of imagistic devices, which were
too unconventional by "socialist realist" standards. A "socialist realist" does not portray Lenin as baying at the moon in any
context, nor does he link Marxian philosophy with a developing
human foetus. And he certainly does not publish such statements
in the West. Sinyavsky observed in his final plea, "I feel
deeply that juridical standards cannot be applied to literature....
You lawyers are concerned with terms which, the more narrowly
defined they are, the more precise they are. By contrast, in
the case of a literary image, the more precise it is, the broader
it is."
Mr. Hayward has written an interesting and lucid account of
the circumstances and events of the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel.
He has treated the two young authors with an impartiality which
was lacking at their trial and in the critiques of their Western
critics. He portrays them not as defiant rebels, but as writers
seeking a freedom of expression in the West; a freedom which was
denied them in the East. The transcript of the trial is certainly
a strong reaffirmation of power of Soviet censorship and the
continuing lack of literary freedom as we know it in Russia. But
hope for the future remains. The censorship system remains under
fire and it, like other Stalinist concepts, will surely one day
change from the situation described by Pasternak:
Only the influential yes-men know
Whom critics are to propagate
With praise, or criticize
and liquidate.

J. J. R., III
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CHINA AFTER MAO. by A. Doak Barnett. With selected documents..
287 pages Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press 1967.
Mainland China is approaching the end of its second decade
under Communist rule. Under the leadership of Mao's Communist
government, life has been infused into a stagnant economy
and the social structure of one of the world's most ancient
societies has been completely revamped. Today, China is
taking its first steps toward becoming a nuclear power. Unfortunately, analysis of the political and social forces
operating in China is difficult. The Western news media have
not been especially helpful, partly because the Red press
prints only what it wants the world to read (recognizing, by
the same token, that the Western press casts its own interpretations on these releases) and partly because most Westerners
are unfamiliar with the personalities .of the Communist ruling
elite. Chinese political figures simply do not travel in
Western circles.
Recently, a number of events have indicated that China
is entering a transitional period. Among these are the recent
violent insurgence of the Red Guard, the sudden disappeaLance
of Mao from public view, and the literal worship of Mao's
Thoughts. What conclusion can be drawn from these collective
events and where is China going?
Mr. Barnett has assumed the formidable task of answering
these questions in only 117 pages of text. Despite this
brevity, his undertaking has been most successful. Because
of the length of the book, Mr. Barnett's analysis of the economic,
political, and social forces must necessarily be general
The book's focus is not on the latest headlines but
rather on the forces and trends which help explain them.
The author begins by analyzing some of the basic unsolved
problems and dilemmas that face the Chinese Communist leaders,
He considers Mao's prescriptions for carrying out the revolution,
both at home and abroad. Finally he discusses possible future
changes in Chinese Communist leadership and the consequences
this may have for China's policies.
Mr. Barnett gives an intriguing account of the economic and social problems which faced the new Communist government in 1949 and of the way in which Mao overcame these problems
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by mobilizing the agricultural economy and initiating the
growth of Chinese industry. Mao's revolutionary ardor gave
the "People's revolution" an impetus which has resulted in
the amazing growth of China's resources. The author has
portrayed this most effectively in his very readable and lucid
style. He ties together the various aspects of Mao's endeavors the push to increase agricultural output, the training of scientific
experts, and the rise of the Communes - which energized the "Great
Leap Forward". The "Great Leap", of course, came to a halt due to
a severe inflation and agricultural collapse in 1960. All of this
is now history, but Mr. Barnett does not treat it as irrelevant.
He constantly relates these previous events to China's present
power struggle.
The only apparent shortcoming of the book is at the same time
one of its major assets - that is, the author has done such an
excellent job in providing a concise discussion of these forces
affecting China and arousing the reader's interest that one only
wishes it were somewhat longer and more detailed. The treatment,
as has been pointed out, is very general. For example, Mr. Barnett
speaks of the difficulties China has encountered in trying to
square Mao's "hard-line" Socialistic ideas on industrial management with the realities of effective operation. An illustration of
particular policy clashes would have been enlightening. A more
detailed discussion of the particular disagreements among members
of the Central Committee - Communist China's highest political
rulers - would have been an aid in understanding the issues
involved in the present power struggle and its potential effect on
China's internal and foreign policies.
The book is certainly well worth reading. It serves as an
excellent starting point for those interested in an explanation
of the recent turbulence in Red China and for those concerned
about China's future role in the community of nations.
AoWoR.
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